Philosophical Studies 109 (1):17-52 (2002)
|Abstract||This paper engages with two compelling challenges to physicalism, each designed to show that the nature of experience is elusive from the standpoint of physical science. It is argued that the physicalist is ultimately well placed to meet both challenges|
|Keywords||Essence Experience Metaphysics Pain Physicalism Property Science Chalmers, D|
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