David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 110 (2):103-13 (2002)
It is often thought that materialism about themind can be clarified using the concept of supervenience. But there is a difficulty. Amaterialist should admit the possibility ofghosts and thus should allow that a world mightduplicate the physical character of our worldand enjoy, in addition, immaterial beings withmental properties. So materialists can't claimthat every world that is physicallyindistinguishable from our world is alsomentally indistinguishable; and this is wellknown. What is less understood are thedifferent ways that immaterial add-ons can maketrouble for supervenience-theoreticformulations of materialism. In this paper, Ishall present a problematic kind of add-on thathas been ignored and look at threesupervenience-theoretic attempts to formulatematerialism in that light.
|Keywords||Definition Materialism Metaphysics Mind Supervenience Chalmers, D Lewis, D|
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Jonathan Schaffer (2008). Truthmaker Commitments. Philosophical Studies 141 (1):7-19.
Robert J. Howell (2009). The Ontology of Subjective Physicalism. Nous 43 (2):315-345.
Stephan Leuenberger (2014). From Grounding to Supervenience? Erkenntnis 79 (1):227-240.
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