Chance and counterfactuals

Abstract
Suppose the world is chancy. The worry arises that most ordinary counterfactuals are false. This paper examines David Lewis' strategy for rescuing such counterfactuals, and argues that it is highly problematic
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References found in this work BETA
David K. Lewis (1999). Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology. Cambridge, Uk ;Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Alastair Wilson (2013). Schaffer on Laws of Nature. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):653-667.
Rachael Briggs (2012). Interventionist Counterfactuals. Philosophical Studies 160 (1):139-166.
David Manley (2012). Dispositionality: Beyond The Biconditionals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):321 - 334.

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