Chance and counterfactuals

Suppose the world is chancy. The worry arises that most ordinary counterfactuals are false. This paper examines David Lewis' strategy for rescuing such counterfactuals, and argues that it is highly problematic
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00534.x
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References found in this work BETA
David K. Lewis (1999). Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology. Cambridge, Uk ;Cambridge University Press.
Robert C. Stalnaker (1968). A Theory of Conditionals. Americal Philosophical Quarterly:98-112.

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Citations of this work BETA
Rachael Briggs (2012). Interventionist Counterfactuals. Philosophical Studies 160 (1):139-166.
Alastair Wilson (2013). Schaffer on Laws of Nature. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):653-667.

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