Chance and counterfactuals
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):396–405 (2005)
| Abstract | Suppose the world is chancy. The worry arises that most ordinary counterfactuals are false. This paper examines David Lewis' strategy for rescuing such counterfactuals, and argues that it is highly problematic | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,701 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesP. Studtmann (2003). Counterfactuals and Inferences a New Form of the Three-Parameter Account of Counterfactuals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):51 – 61.
Alexander R. Pruss (2003). David Lewis's Counterfactual Arrow of Time. Noûs 37 (4):606–637.
Jens Harbecke (2011). Mind in a Humean World. Metaphysica 12 (2):213-229.
Phil Dowe (2009). Would‐Cause Semantics. Philosophy of Science 76 (5).
David K. Lewis (2001). Counterfactuals. Blackwell Publishers.
S. Barker (1999). Counterfactuals, Probabilistic Counterfactuals and Causation. Mind 108 (431):427-469.
Robert Williams (2008). Chances, Counterfactuals, and Similarity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):385-420.
James Woodward (2004). Counterfactuals and Causal Explanation. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18 (1):41 – 72.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads144 ( #2,806 of 549,122 )Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,390 of 549,122 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
