David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind 114 (454):277-320 (2005)
I argue that Bayesians need two distinct notions of probability. We need the usual degree-of-belief notion that is central to the Bayesian account of rational decision. But Bayesians also need a separate notion of probability that represents the degree to which evidence supports hypotheses. Although degree-of-belief is well suited to the theory of rational decision, Bayesians have tried to apply it to the realm of hypothesis confirmation as well. This double duty leads to the problem of old evidence, a problem that, we will see, is much more extensive than usually recognized. I will argue that degree-of-support is distinct from degree-of-belief, that it is not just a kind of counterfactual degree-of-belief, and that it supplements degree-of-belief in a way that resolves the problems of old evidence and provides a richer account of the logic of scientific inference and belief.
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Citations of this work BETA
Matthias Unterhuber & Gerhard Schurz (2013). The New Tweety Puzzle: Arguments Against Monistic Bayesian Approaches in Epistemology and Cognitive Science. Synthese 190 (8):1407-1435.
Joel Pust (2013). Sleeping Beauty, Evidential Support and Indexical Knowledge: Reply to Horgan. Synthese 190 (9):1489-1501.
Branden Fitelson (2006). The Paradox of Confirmation. Philosophy Compass 1 (1):95–113.
Peter Brössel & Franz Huber (2014). Bayesian Confirmation: A Means with No End. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (4):axu004.
Alexander Reutlinger & Matthias Unterhuber (2014). Thinking About Non-Universal Laws. Erkenntnis 79 (10):1703-1713.
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