Desiring the bad under the guise of the good

Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):244–264 (2008)
Abstract
Desire is commonly spoken of as a state in which the desired object seems good, which apparently ascribes an evaluative element to desire. I offer a new defence of this old idea. As traditionally conceived, this view faces serious objections related to its way of characterizing desire's evaluative content. I develop an alternative conception of evaluative mental content which is plausible in its own right, allows the evaluative desire theorist to avoid the standard objections, and sheds interesting new light on the idea of evaluative experience.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.520.x
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References found in this work BETA
Gary Watson (1975). Free Agency. Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20.
Dennis W. Stampe (1987). The Authority of Desire. Philosophical Review 96 (July):335-81.
Mark Johnston (2001). The Authority of Affect. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):181-214.

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Citations of this work BETA
Francesco Orsi (2015). The Guise of the Good. Philosophy Compass 10 (10):714-724.
Attila Tanyi (2011). Sobel on Pleasure, Reason, and Desire. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (1):101-115.

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