David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):602-621 (2005)
Closest-continuer or best-candidate accounts of persistence seem deeply unsatisfactory, but it’s hard to say why. The standard criticism is that such accounts violate the ‘only a and b’ rule, but this criticism merely highlights a feature of the accounts without explaining why the feature is unacceptable. Another concern is that such accounts violate some principle about the supervenience of persistence facts upon local or intrinsic facts. But, again, we do not seem to have an independent justification for this supervenience claim. Instead, I argue that closest continuer accounts are committed to unexplained correlations between distinct existences, and that this is their fundamental flaw. We can have independent justification for rejecting such correlations, but what the justification is depends upon much broader issues in ontology. There is no one-size-fits all objection to closest-continuer accounts of persistence
|Keywords||PERSONAL IDENTITY HUMEAN SUPERVENIENCE TEMPORAL PARTS WORLDS TIME|
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Derek Parfit (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.
David K. Lewis (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Blackwell Publishers.
Nathan U. Salmon (2005). Reference and Essence. Prometheus Books.
Robert Nozick (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Harvard University Press.
Theodore Sider (2001). Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Heather Demarest (2015). Fission May Kill You. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3).
J. Robert G. Williams (2013). Part‐Intrinsicality. Noûs 47 (3):431-452.
Katherine Hawley (2008). Persistence and Determination. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 62 (62):197-212.
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