David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Ellery Eells & James Fetzer (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science. Springer. 247--275 (2010)
The Paradox of the Ravens (a.k.a,, The Paradox of Confirmation) is indeed an old chestnut. A great many things have been written and said about this paradox and its implications for the logic of evidential support. The first part of this paper will provide a brief survey of the early history of the paradox. This will include the original formulation of the paradox and the early responses of Hempel, Goodman, and Quine. The second part of the paper will describe attempts to resolve the paradox within a Bayesian framework, and show how to improve upon them. This part begins with a discussion of how probabilistic methods can help to clarify the statement of the paradox itself. And it describes some of the early responses to probabilistic explications. We then inspect the assumptions employed by traditional (canonical) Bayesian approaches to the paradox. These assumptions may appear to be overly strong. So, drawing on weaker assumptions, we formulate a new-and-improved Bayesian confirmation-theoretic resolution of the Paradox of the Ravens.
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Citations of this work BETA
Brian Laetz (2011). Does the Bayesian Solution to the Paradox of Confirmation Really Support Bayesianism? European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (1):39-46.
Florian F. Schiller (2012). Why Bayesians Needn't Be Afraid of Observing Many Non-Black Non-Ravens. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 43 (1):77-88.
William Roche (2013). On the Truth-Conduciveness of Coherence. Erkenntnis:1-19.
Jan Sprenger (2011). Hypothetico-Deductive Confirmation. Philosophy Compass 6 (7):497-508.
Jan Sprenger (2013). A Synthesis of Hempelian and Hypothetico-Deductive Confirmation. Erkenntnis 78 (4):727-738.
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