Identity and Indiscernibility

Mind 118 (469):101 - 119 (2009)
Putative counterexamples to the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) are notoriously inconclusive. I establish ground rules for debate in this area, offer a new response to such counterexamples for friends of the PII, but then argue that no response is entirely satisfactory. Finally, I undermine some positive arguments for PII.
Keywords Indiscernibility  Identity
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DOI 10.2307/20532734
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Sam Cowling (2014). No Simples, No Gunk, No Nothing. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (1):246-260.

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