David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (2004)
Knowledge and Lotteries is organized around an epistemological puzzle: in many cases, we seem consistently inclined to deny that we know a certain class of propositions, while crediting ourselves with knowledge of propositions that imply them. In its starkest form, the puzzle is this: we do not think we know that a given lottery ticket will be a loser, yet we normally count ourselves as knowing all sorts of ordinary things that entail that its holder will not suddenly acquire a large fortune. After providing a number of specific and general characterizations of the puzzle, Hawthorne carefully examines the competing merits of candidate solutions. In so doing, he explores a number of central questions concerning the nature and importance of knowledge, including the relationship of knowledge to assertion and practical reasoning, the status of epistemic closure principles, the merits of various brands of scepticism, the prospects for a contextualist account of knowledge, and the potential for other sorts of salience-sensitive accounts. Along the way, he offers a careful treatment of pertinent issues at the foundations of semantics. His book will be of interest to anyone working in the field of epistemology, as well as to philosophers of language.
|Keywords||knowledge practical reasoning contextualism pragmatic encroachment epistemology|
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|Buy the book||$12.45 used (80% off) $32.22 direct from Amazon (20% off) $34.57 new (24% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||BD212.O46 2004|
|ISBN(s)||0199287139 0199269556 9780199269556 9780199287130|
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Citations of this work BETA
Lara Buchak (2013). Belief, Credence, and Norms. Philosophical Studies (2):1-27.
Jonathan Schaffer & Joshua Knobe (2012). Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed. Noûs 46 (4):675-708.
Clayton Littlejohn (2010). Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Norms. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):79 – 100.
Roger White (2006). Problems for Dogmatism. Philosophical Studies 131 (3):525--57.
Cian Dorr, Jeremy Goodman & John Hawthorne (2014). Knowing Against the Odds. Philosophical Studies 170 (2):277-287.
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