Philosophical Topics 30 (1):53-76 (2002)
Think of “locations” very abstractly, as positions in a space, any space. Temporal locations are positions in time; spatial locations are positions in (physical) space; particulars are locations in quality space. Should we reify locations? Are locations entities? Spatiotemporal relation- alists say there are no such things as spatiotemporal locations; the fundamental spatial and temporal facts involve no locations as objects, only the instantiation of spatial and temporal relations. The denial of locations in quality space is the bundle theory, according to which particulars do not exist; facts apparently about particulars really concern relations between universals. A “space”, in our abstract sense, consists of a set of objects, together with properties and relations defined on those objects. The objects are the locations of the space, and the distribution of the properties and relations over the locations defines the space’s structure. All spaces are thus quality spaces; when the relations are thought of as spatiotemporal then the space is also a spatiotemporal space. By not reifying locations one denies that these abstract spaces isomorphically represent the real world. The real world does in some sense have a structure that can be non-isomorphically represented by a space (or, more likely, a class of spaces), but the locations in those spaces do not correspond to anything real. We will examine modal considerations on reifying locations. Denying the existence of spatiotemporal locations excludes certain possibilities for spatiotemporal reality. Denying the existence of qualitative locations excludes certain possibilities for qualitative space. In each case the excluded possibilities are pre-analytically possible. Some of the possibilities can be reinstated by modifying the locationless theories, but at the cost of an unattractive holism. Do these modal considerations mandate postulating locations? That depends on whether modal intuition can teach us about the actual world..
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.5840/philtopics200230110
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,217
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Chad Carmichael (2016). Deep Platonism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):307-328.
Kris McDaniel (2010). A Return to the Analogy of Being. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):688 - 717.
Theodore Sider (2006). Bare Particulars. Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):387–397.

View all 14 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Casey O'Callaghan (2010). Perceiving the Locations of Sounds. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (1):123-140.
Casey O'Callaghan (2010). Perceiving the Locations of Sounds. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (1):123--140.
Ned Markosian (2000). What Are Physical Objects? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):375-395.
Sam Cowling (2014). Instantiation as Location. Philosophical Studies 167 (3):667-682.
D. Dieks (2001). Space and Time in Particle and Field Physics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 32 (2):217-241.
Rom Harré (1991). Some Reflections on the Individuation of Events. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 5 (1):49-63.
Rom Harré (1991). Some Reflections on the Individuation of Events. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 5 (1):49 – 63.
Gabriel Uzquiano (2011). Mereological Harmony. In Karen Bennett & Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

191 ( #20,110 of 1,932,465 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

17 ( #40,157 of 1,932,465 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.