Neo‐Fregeanism and Quantifier Variance

Sider argues that, of maximalism and quantifier variance, the latter promises to let us make better sense of neo-Fregeanism. I argue that neo-Fregeans should, and seemingly do, reject quantifier variance. If they must choose between these two options, they should choose maximalism.
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References found in this work BETA
D. M. Armstrong (1993). A World of States of Affairs. Philosophical Perspectives 7:429-440.
Matti Eklund (2006). Neo-Fregean Ontology. Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):95–121.

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Citations of this work BETA
Bob Hale (2007). Neo-Fregeanism and Quantifier Variance. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):375-385.
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