Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Psychology 2 (1):5-16 (1989)
|Abstract||This paper presents considerations in favour of the view that traditional (classical) architectures can be seen as emergent features of connectionist networks with distributed representation. A recent paper by William Bechtel (1988) which argues for a similar conclusion is unsatisfactory in that it fails to consider whether the compositional syntax and semantics attributed to mental representations by classical models can emerge within a connectionist network. The compatibility of the two paradigms hinges largely, I suggest, on how this question is answered. Focusing on the issue of syntax, I argue that while such structure is lacking in connectionist models with local representation, it can be accommodated within networks where representation is distributed. I discuss an important paper by Smolenski (1988) which attempts to show how connectionists can incorporate the relevant syntactic structure, suggesting that some criticisms levelled against that paper by Fodor & Pylyshyn (1988) are wanting. I then go on to indicate a strategy by which a compositional syntax and semantics can be defined for the sort of network that Smolenski describes. I conclude that since the connectionist can respect the central tenets of classicism, the two approaches are compatible with one another.|
|Keywords||Cognitive Connectionism Language Smolenski, P|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
James W. Garson (1994). Cognition Without Classical Architecture. Synthese 100 (2):291-306.
Mark Rowlands (1994). Connectionism and the Language of Thought. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):485-503.
Brian P. McLaughlin & F. Warfield (1994). The Allure of Connectionism Reexamined. Synthese 101 (3):365-400.
Michael V. Antony (1991). Fodor and Pylyshyn on Connectionism. Minds and Machines 1 (3):321-41.
James W. Garson (2003). Simulation and Connectionism: What is the Connection? Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):499-515.
David J. Chalmers (1993). Connectionism and Compositionality: Why Fodor and Pylyshyn Were Wrong. Philosophical Psychology 6 (3):305-319.
Michael R. W. Dawson, D. A. Medler & Istvan S. N. Berkeley (1997). PDP Networks Can Provide Models That Are Not Mere Implementations of Classical Theories. Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):25-40.
Josep E. Corbí (1993). Classical and Connectionist Models: Levels of Description. Synthese 95 (2):141 - 168.
Murat Aydede (1997). Language of Thought: The Connectionist Contribution. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 7 (1):57-101.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads18 ( #74,582 of 739,352 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,538 of 739,352 )
How can I increase my downloads?