PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:241 - 249 (1994)
|Abstract||The objectivity of Bayesian induction relies on the ability of evidence to produce a convergence to agreement among agents who initially disagree about the plausibilities of hypotheses. I will describe three sorts of Bayesian convergence. The first reduces the objectivity of inductions about simple "occurrent events" to the objectivity of posterior probabilities for theoretical hypotheses. The second reveals that evidence will generally induce converge to agreement among agents on the posterior probabilities of theories only if the convergence is 0 or 1. The third establishes conditions under which evidence will very probably compel posterior probabilities of theories to converge to 0 or 1|
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