David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):481 – 493 (2006)
I argue that, despite van Inwagen’s pessimism about the task, it is worth looking for answers to his General Composition Question. Such answers or ‘principles of composition’ tell us about the relationship between an object and its parts. I compare principles of composition with criteria of identity, arguing that, just as different sorts of thing satisfy different criteria of identity, they may satisfy different principles of composition. Variety in criteria of identity is not taken to reflect ontological variety in the identity relation; I discuss whether variety in principles of composition should be taken to reflect ontological variety in the composition relation.
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References found in this work BETA
Lynne Rudder Baker (2000). Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View. Cambridge University Press.
Donald Davidson (1969). The Individuation of Events. In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel. Reidel 216-34.
Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) (2002). Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Karen Bennett (2011). Construction Area (No Hard Hat Required). Philosophical Studies 154 (1):79-104.
Joshua Spencer (2013). Strong Composition as Identity and Simplicity. Erkenntnis 78 (5):1177-1184.
J. Robert G. Williams (2008). Working Parts: Reply to Mellor. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 62 (62):81-106.
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