American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (1):19 - 31 (2003)
|Abstract||Modern epistemologists don’t often discuss knowledge-how - propositional knowledge has attracted the lion’s share of attention.2 Yet the notion of knowledge-how looks useful elsewhere in philosophy - philosophers of science discuss tacit knowledge and skills, philosophers of mind disagree about whether knowing what an experience is like is a matter of knowing how to imagine or recognise it, and philosophers of language and of value consider whether knowledge of meaning or morality is knowledge-how (to use words, to follow rules, to behave well).3 Without a fuller understanding of knowledge-how, it is difficult to assess these proposals. Moreover, knowledge-how is interesting qua species of knowledge - when set alongside theories of propositional knowledge, enquiry into other forms of knowledge promises to shed light on the nature of knowledge quite generally. What is it that we value about our interactions with the world, whether these interactions are through belief or through action?|
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