The Admissible Contents of Experience

Wiley-Blackwell (2011)
Which objects and properties are represented in perceptual experience, and how are we able to determine this? The papers in this collection address these questions together with other fundamental questions about the nature of perceptual content. The book draws together papers by leading international philosophers of mind, including Alex Byrne, Alva Noë, Tim Bayne, Michael Tye, Richard Price and Susanna Siegel Essays address the central questions surrounding the content of perceptual experience Investigates how are we able to determine the admissible contents of experience Published in association with the journal _Philosophical Quarterly_.
Keywords Experience  Perception  Evidence  Belief and doubt  PHILOSOPHY / Logic
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Call number B105.E9.A35 2011
ISBN(s) 9781444333350     9781444343885   9781444343892   9781444343908
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Elijah Chudnoff (2015). Phenomenal Contrast Arguments for Cognitive Phenomenology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):82-104.

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