David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (2012)
This book critically examines some widespread views about the semantic phenomenon of reference and the cognitive phenomenon of singular thought. It begins with a defense of the view that neither is tied to a special relation of causal or epistemic acquaintance. It then challenges the alleged semantic rift between definite and indefinite descriptions on the one hand, and names and demonstratives on the other—a division that has been motivated in part by appeals to considerations of acquaintance. Drawing on recent work in semantics, the book explores a more unified account of all four types of expression, according to which none of them paradigmatically fits the profile of a referential term. On the proposed framework, all four involve existential quantification but admit of uses that exhibit many of the traits associated with reference—a phenomenon that is due to the presence of what we call a ‘singular restriction’ on the existentially quantified domain. The book concludes by drawing out some implications of the proposed semantic picture for the traditional categories of reference and singular thought.
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Citations of this work BETA
Anders Johan Schoubye (2013). Ghosts, Murderers, and the Semantics of Descriptions. Noûs 47 (3):496-533.
John Hawthorne (2012). Some Comments on Fricker's 'Stating and Insinuating'. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):95-108.
Samuel Cumming (2014). Indefinites and Intentional Identity. Philosophical Studies 168 (2):371-395.
William Lanier (2014). Intentional Identity and Descriptions. Philosophical Studies 170 (2):289-302.
Aidan Gray (2014). Name-Bearing, Reference, and Circularity. Philosophical Studies 171 (2):207-231.
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