David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 148 (1):61 - 68 (2010)
Theories of well-being are typically divided into subjective and objective. Subjective theories are those which make facts about a person’s welfare depend on facts about her actual or hypothetical mental states. I am interested in what motivates this approach to the theory of welfare. The contemporary view is that subjectivism is devoted to honoring the evaluative perspective of the individual, but this is both a misleading account of the motivations behind subjectivism, and a vision that dooms subjective theories to failure. I suggest that we need to revisit and reinstate certain features of traditional hedonism, in particular the idea that felt experience plays a role that no theory of welfare can afford to ignore. I then offer a sketch of a theory that is subjective in my preferred sense and avoids the worst sins of hedonism as well as the problems generated by the contemporary constraints of subjective theorists.
|Keywords||Well-being Welfare Happiness Good life Subjective theories of welfare Hedonism Affect Role of depression in a theory of well-being|
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References found in this work BETA
David Owen Brink (1989). Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
Fred Feldman (2004). Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature, Varieties and Plausibility of Hedonism. Clarendon Press.
Fred Feldman (2010). What is This Thing Called Happiness? Oxford University Press.
Jennifer S. Hawkins (2008). Well-Being, Autonomy, and the Horizon Problem. Utilitas 20 (2):143-168.
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