Weak discernibility

Analysis 66 (292):300–303 (2006)
Simon Saunders argues that, although distinct objects must be discernible, they need only be weakly discernible (Saunders 2003, 2006a). I will argue that this combination of views is unmotivated: if there can be objects which differ only weakly, there can be objects which don’t differ at all.
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DOI 10.1093/analys/66.4.300
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Tomasz Bigaj (2015). Dissecting Weak Discernibility of Quanta. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 50:43-53.

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