Why temporary properties are not relations between physical objects and times
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):211–216 (1998)
| Abstract | Take this banana. It is now yellow, and when I bought it yesterday it was green. How can a single object be both green all over and yellow all over without contradiction? It is, of course, the passage of time which dissolves the contradiction, but how is this possible? How can a banana ripen? These questions raise the problem of change. The problem is sometimes called the problem of temporary intrinsics, but, as I shall explain below, this emphasis on intrinsic properties is misleading. | |||||||||
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