Why Temporary Properties Are Not Relations Be- tween Physical Objects and Times

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):211–216 (1998)
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Abstract

Take this banana. It is now yellow, and when I bought it yesterday it was green. How can a single object be both green all over and yellow all over without contradiction? It is, of course, the passage of time which dissolves the contradiction, but how is this possible? How can a banana ripen? These questions raise the problem of change. The problem is sometimes called the problem of temporary intrinsics, but, as I shall explain below, this emphasis on intrinsic properties is misleading. For my more recent thoughts in this area, please see my 'David Lewis on Persistence' (2015).

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Author's Profile

Katherine Hawley
PhD: Cambridge University; Last affiliation: University of St. Andrews

Citations of this work

Memory and the Past.L. M. Mitias - 2008 - Dissertation, University of Hawaii at Manoa
Esistenza e Persistenza.Damiano Costa - 2018 - Milan, IT: Mimesis.

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
On the Plurality of Worlds.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):42-47.
Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics.Sally Haslanger - 1989 - Analysis 49 (3):119-125.
Parthood and identity across time.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1983 - Journal of Philosophy 80 (4):201-220.

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