David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Noûs 41 (3):394–428 (2007)
This paper aims to show that widespread, serious errors in the self-assessment of affect are a genuine possibility-one worth taking very seriously. For we are subject to a variety of errors concerning the character of our present and past affective states, or "affective ignorance." For example, some affects, particularly moods, can greatly affect the quality of our experience even when we are unable to discern them. I note several implications of these arguments. First, we may be less competent pursuers of happiness than is commonly believed, raising difficult questions for political thought. Second, some of the errors discussed ramify for our understanding of consciousness, including Ned Block's controversial distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. Third, empirical results based on self-reports about affect may be systematically misleading in certain ways
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References found in this work BETA
Jesse J. Prinz (2004). Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of the Emotions. Oxford University Press.
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Timothy D. Wilson (2002). Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious. Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Tim Bayne & Maja Spener (2010). Introspective Humility. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):1-22.
Anna Alexandrova (2008). First-Person Reports and the Measurement of Happiness. Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):571 – 583.
Anna Alexandrova (2015). Well‐Being and Philosophy of Science. Philosophy Compass 10 (3):219-231.
Jason Marsh (2014). Quality of Life Assessments, Cognitive Reliability, and Procreative Responsibility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):436-466.
Neil Levy (2012). Ecological Engineering: Reshaping Our Environments to Achieve Our Goals. Philosophy and Technology 25 (4):589-604.
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