David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Noûs 41 (3):394–428 (2007)
This paper aims to show that widespread, serious errors in the self-assessment of affect are a genuine possibility-one worth taking very seriously. For we are subject to a variety of errors concerning the character of our present and past affective states, or "affective ignorance." For example, some affects, particularly moods, can greatly affect the quality of our experience even when we are unable to discern them. I note several implications of these arguments. First, we may be less competent pursuers of happiness than is commonly believed, raising difficult questions for political thought. Second, some of the errors discussed ramify for our understanding of consciousness, including Ned Block's controversial distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. Third, empirical results based on self-reports about affect may be systematically misleading in certain ways
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References found in this work BETA
Claire Armon-Jones (1991). Varieties of Affect. University of Toronto Press.
Kent C. Berridge & Piotr Winkielman (2003). What is an Unconscious Emotion? (The Case for Unconscious "Liking"). Cognition and Emotion 17 (2):181-211.
N. Block (2001). Paradox and Cross Purposes in Recent Work on Consciousness. Cognition 79 (1-2):197-219.
Ned Block (1995). On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Ned Block (2003). Philosophical Issues About Consciousness. In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.
Citations of this work BETA
Tim Bayne & Maja Spener (2010). Introspective Humility. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):1-22.
Donald W. Bruckner (2011). Subjective Well-Being and Desire Satisfaction. Philosophical Papers 39 (1):1-28.
Anna Alexandrova (2008). First-Person Reports and the Measurement of Happiness. Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):571 – 583.
John Paley (2010). Qualitative Interviewing as Measurement. Nursing Philosophy 11 (2):112-126.
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