David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):287–317 (2005)
The psychological condition of being happy is best understood as a matter of a person’s emotional condition. I elucidate the notion of an emotional condition by introducing two distinctions concerning affect, and argue that this “emotional state” view is probably superior on intuitive and substantive grounds to theories that identify happiness with pleasure or life satisfaction. Life satisfaction views, for example, appear to have deflationary consequences for happiness’ value. This would make happiness an unpromising candidate for the central element in a theory of well-being, as it is in L. W. Sumner’s work. Yet on an emotional state conception, happiness may prove to be a key constituent of well-being. The emotional state view also makes happiness less vulnerable to common doubts about the importance of happiness, and indicates that mood states are more important for well-being than is generally recognized.
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Nozick (1974). Anarchy, State and Utopia. Basic Books.
Martha Nussbaum (2001). Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach. Cambridge University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Daniel M. Haybron (2007). Do We Know How Happy We Are? On Some Limits of Affective Introspection and Recall. Noûs 41 (3):394–428.
Valerie Tiberius (2006). Well-Being: Psychological Research for Philosophers. Philosophy Compass 1 (5):493–505.
Laura Sizer (2010). Good and Good for You: An Affect Theory of Happiness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):133-163.
Daniel M. Haybron (2011). Taking the Satisfaction (and the Life) Out of Life Satisfaction. Philosophical Explorations 14 (3):249-262.
Jason Marsh (2014). Quality of Life Assessments, Cognitive Reliability, and Procreative Responsibility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):436-466.
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Dan Haybron (forthcoming). Happiness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Fred Feldman (2010). What is This Thing Called Happiness? Oxford University Press.
Panos Dimas (2002). Happiness in the Euthydemus. Phronesis 47 (1):1-27.
Daniel M. Haybron (2003). What Do We Want From a Theory of Happiness? Metaphilosophy 34 (3):305-329.
Fred Feldman (2008). Whole Life Satisfaction Concepts of Happiness. Theoria 74 (3):219-238.
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