Color objectivism and color projectivism

Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):751 - 765 (2011)
Abstract
Objectivism and projectivism are standardly taken to be incompatible theories of color. Here we argue that this incompatibility is only apparent: objectivism and projectivism, properly articulated so as to deal with basic objections, are in fundamental agreement about the ontology of color and the phenomenology of color perception
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References found in this work BETA
Alex Byrne (2007). Truest Blue. Analysis 67 (293):87-92.

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