Color objectivism and color projectivism

Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):751 - 765 (2011)
Objectivism and projectivism are standardly taken to be incompatible theories of color. Here we argue that this incompatibility is only apparent: objectivism and projectivism, properly articulated so as to deal with basic objections, are in fundamental agreement about the ontology of color and the phenomenology of color perception
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DOI 10.1080/09515089.2011.562645
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