|Abstract||In this paper I propose a relativistic version of entitlement theory about reasonable belief (§2) and argue that this vindicates naïve liberalism (§1): the view that there can be mutually recognized reasonable disagreements in religion and politics. I describe the conditions for mutually recognized reasonable disagreement (§3), and consider some objections to the proposed view (§4).|
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