David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Acta Analytica 27 (4):461-478 (2012)
In “The Myth of Factive Verbs” (Hazlett 2010), I had four closely related goals. The first (pp. 497-99, p. 522) was to criticize appeals to ordinary language in epistemology. The second (p. 499) was to criticize the argument that truth is a necessary condition on knowledge because “knows” is factive. The third (pp. 507-19) – which was the intended means of achieving the first two – was to defend a semantics for “knows” on which <S knows p> can be true even if p isn’t true. The fourth (Ibid.) – which seemed necessary for the success of the third – was to defend a pragmatic account of the fact that utterances of <S knows p> typically imply p, on which the implication in those cases is down to conversational implicature. In this paper I’ll go after these goals again, with an emphasis on the second. Our topic will be whether the factivity of “knows” (whatever this amounts to) supports the truth condition on knowledge. A new goal will be to defend my argument against some criticisms from John Turri (2011) and Savas Tsohatzidis (forthcoming). We’ll first look at the truth condition (§1) and factive presupposition (§§2 – 3), before turning to replies to Turri and Tsohatzidis (§§4 – 7).
|Keywords||Knowledge Presupposition Factive verbs|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Timothy Williamson (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press.
John Greco (2010). Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity. Cambridge University Press.
Keith DeRose (2009). The Case for Contextualism. Oxford University Press.
H. P. Grice (1989). Studies in the Way of Words. Harvard University Press.
Gottlob Frege (2010). On Sense and Reference. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing About Language. Routledge 36--56.
Citations of this work BETA
John Turri (2013). The Test of Truth: An Experimental Investigation of the Norm of Assertion. Cognition 129 (2):279-291.
Wesley Buckwalter, David Rose & John Turri (2013). Belief Through Thick and Thin. Noûs 47 (3):748-775.
Roberta Colonna Dahlman (forthcoming). Did People in the Middle Ages Know That the Earth Was Flat? Acta Analytica:1-14.
Roberta Colonna Dahlman (2013). Conversational Implicatures Are Still Cancellable. Acta Analytica 28 (3):321-327.
Similar books and articles
Michael Hannon (2013). 'Knows' Entails Truth. Journal of Philosophical Research 38:349-366.
Wesley Buckwalter (2014). Factive Verbs and Protagonist Projection. Episteme 11 (4):391-409.
Savas L. Tsohatzidis (2012). How to Forget That 'Know' is Factive. Acta Analytica 27 (4):449-459.
Baron Reed (2005). Accidentally Factive Mental States. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):134–142.
Fredrik Stjernberg (2009). Restricting Factiveness. Philosophical Studies 146 (1):29 - 48.
Rik Peels (2012). The New View on Ignorance Undefeated. Philosophia 40 (4):741-750.
Moti Mizrahi (2012). Idealizations and Scientific Understanding. Philosophical Studies 160 (2):237-252.
Paul Egré (2008). Question-Embedding and Factivity. Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):85-125.
Declan Smithies (2012). Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):723-741.
Allan Hazlett (2010). The Myth of Factive Verbs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):497 - 522.
Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno (2006). Knowability and a Modal Closure Principle. American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (3):261-270.
Added to index2012-01-20
Total downloads1,115 ( #138 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)235 ( #1,618 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?