A new problem for ontological emergence

Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):55-62 (2006)
It is becoming increasingly common to find phenomena described as emergent. There are two sorts of philosophical analysis of emergence. Ontological analyses ground emergence in real, distinct, emergent properties. Epistemological analyses deny emergent properties and stress instead facts about our epistemic status. I review a standard worry for ontological analyses of emergence, that they entail a surfeit of metaphysics, and find that it can easily be sidestepped. I go on to present a new worry, that ontological emergentism entails a highly implausible ontology, which is harder for the ontological emergentist to avoid
Keywords Emergence  Metaphysics  Ontology  Phenomena  Properties
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    References found in this work BETA
    Paul W. Humphreys (1997). Emergence, Not Supervenience. Philosophy of Science Supplement 64 (4):337-45.
    Jaegwon Kim (1999). Making Sense of Emergence. Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):3-36.
    Jaegwon Kim (1978). Supervenience and Nomological Incommensurables. American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (April):149-56.
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