A new problem for ontological emergence

Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):55-62 (2006)
It is becoming increasingly common to find phenomena described as emergent. There are two sorts of philosophical analysis of emergence. Ontological analyses ground emergence in real, distinct, emergent properties. Epistemological analyses deny emergent properties and stress instead facts about our epistemic status. I review a standard worry for ontological analyses of emergence, that they entail a surfeit of metaphysics, and find that it can easily be sidestepped. I go on to present a new worry, that ontological emergentism entails a highly implausible ontology, which is harder for the ontological emergentist to avoid
Keywords Emergence  Metaphysics  Ontology  Phenomena  Properties
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2005.00428.x
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References found in this work BETA
Jaegwon Kim (1999). Making Sense of Emergence. Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):3-36.
Paul W. Humphreys (1997). Emergence, Not Supervenience. Philosophy of Science Supplement 64 (4):337-45.
Jaegwon Kim (1978). Supervenience and Nomological Incommensurables. American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (April):149-56.

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