Desire satisfactionism and hedonism

Philosophical Studies 128 (3):539-563 (2006)
Abstract
Hedonism and the desire-satisfaction theory of welfare ("desire satisfactionism") are typically seen as archrivals in the contest over identifying what makes one's life go best. It is surprising, then, that the most plausible form of hedonism just is the most plausible form of desire satisfactionism. How can a single theory of welfare be a version of both hedonism and desire satisfactionism? The answer lies in what pleasure is: pleasure is, in my view, the subjective satisfaction of desire. This thesis about pleasure is clarified and defended only after we proceed through the dialectics that get us to the most plausible forms of hedonism and desire satisfactionism.
Keywords Desire  Hedonism  Pleasure  Satisfaction  Welfare
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References found in this work BETA
R. B. Brandt (1991). Overvold on Self-Interest and Self-Sacrifice. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:353-363.
Fred Feldman (2002). The Good Life: A Defense of Attitudinal Hedonism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):604-628.

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Citations of this work BETA
Aaron Smuts (2011). The Feels Good Theory of Pleasure. Philosophical Studies 155 (2):241-265.
Donald W. Bruckner (2013). Present Desire Satisfaction and Past Well-Being. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):15 - 29.
Jason Raibley (2013). Health and Well-Being. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):469-489.

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