David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Cambridge University Press (2003)
Recent philosophy of mind has had a mistaken conception of the nature of psychological concepts. It has assumed too much similarity between psychological judgments and those of natural science and has thus overlooked the fact that other people are not just objects whose thoughts we may try to predict and control but fellow creatures with whom we talk and co-operate. In this collection of essays, Jane Heal argues that central to our ability to arrive at views about others' thoughts is not knowledge of some theory of the mind but rather an ability to imagine alternative worlds and how things appear from another person's point of view. She then applies this view to questions of how we represent others' thoughts, the shape of psychological concepts, the nature of rationality and the possibility of first person authority. This book should appeal to students and professionals in philosophy of mind and language
|Keywords||Imagination Indexical Language Metaphysics Mind Other Minds Predicate Reason Simulation Thought|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$6.08 used (95% off) $7.00 new (94% off) $108.30 direct from Amazon (5% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||BD418.3.H44 2003|
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Citations of this work BETA
Benj Hellie (2011). There It Is. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):110-164.
Nick Zangwill (2009). Normativity and the Metaphysics of Mind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):1–19.
Luca Barlassina (2013). Simulation is Not Enough: A Hybrid Model of Disgust Attribution on the Basis of Visual Stimuli. Philosophical Psychology 26 (3):401-419.
Karsten R. Stueber (2012). Understanding Versus Explanation? How to Think About the Distinction Between the Human and the Natural Sciences. Inquiry 55 (1):17 - 32.
Shannon Spaulding (2012). Mirror Neurons Are Not Evidence for the Simulation Theory. Synthese 189 (3):515-534.
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