David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (1):1-19 (2001)
How are we to explain the authority we have in pronouncing on our own thoughts? A 'constitutive' theory, on which a second-level belief may help to constitute the first-level state it is about, has considerable advantages, for example in relieving pressures towards dualism. The paper aims to exploit an analogy between authority in performative utterances and authority on the psychological to get a clearer view of how such a constitutive account might work and its metaphysical presuppositions
|Keywords||Authority First Person Language Performatives Psychology|
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Lucy F. O'Brien (2005). Self-Knowledge, Agency, and Force. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):580–601.
Robert Hanna & Monima Chadha (2011). Non-Conceptualism and the Problem of Perceptual Self-Knowledge. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):184-223.
James Russell (2007). Controlling Core Knowledge: Conditions for the Ascription of Intentional States to Self and Others by Children. Synthese 159 (2):167 - 196.
Lucy O'Brien (2005). Self-Knowledge, Agency and Force. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):580-601.
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