Truthmaking and the alleged need for relevance
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Logique and Analyse 46 (183-184):345-364 (2003)
Since 1969, when Bas van Fraassen wrote 'Facts and Tautological Entailments', it has been assumed that if facts, or states of affairs, exist at all, they can only play the role of truthmakers for propositions if the truthmaker relation is defined in a relevantist revision of classical logic. Greg Restall revived this notion in 1996, and it has since been discussed positively by Stephen Read. I argue in this paper that this was always a mistake. The truthmaking relation between facts and propositions can indeed be made sense of-but no relevantist revision of classical logic is required. The correspondence theory of truth can thus be shown to have been essentially correct all along.
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Jamin Asay (2014). Against Truth. Erkenntnis 79 (1):147-164.
Sven Bernecker (2011). Keeping Track of the Gettier Problem. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):127-152.
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