The reduction of sensory pleasure to desire

Philosophical Studies 133 (1):23-44 (2007)
One of the leading approaches to the nature of sensory pleasure reduces it to desire: roughly, a sensation qualifies as a sensation of pleasure just in case its subject wants to be feeling it. This approach is, in my view, correct, but it has never been formulated quite right; and it needs to be defended against some compelling arguments. Thus the purpose of this paper is to discover the most defensible formulation of this rough idea, and to defend it against the most interesting objections.
Keywords Pleasure  Pain  Desire  Motivational theory of pleasure  Hedonism
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DOI 10.2307/25471884
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Aaron Smuts (2011). The Feels Good Theory of Pleasure. Philosophical Studies 155 (2):241-265.
Eden Lin (2014). Pluralism About Well‐Being. Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):127-154.

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