David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophers' Imprint 2 (2):1-33 (2002)
Frege held that referring expressions in general, and demonstratives and indexicals in particular, contribute more than just their reference to what is expressed by utterances of sentences containing them. Heck first attempts to get clear about what the essence of the Fregean view is, arguing that it rests upon a certain conception of linguistic communication that is ultimately indefensible. On the other hand, however, he argues that understanding a demonstrative (or indexical) utterance requires one to think of the object denoted in an appropriate way. This fact makes it difficult to reconcile the view that referring expressions are "directly referential" with any view that seeks (as Grice's does) to ground meaning in facts about communication
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
David J. Chalmers (2011). Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account. Noûs 45 (4):595-639.
Richard Heck & Robert May (2011). The Composition of Thoughts. Noûs 45 (1):126-166.
Kevin Falvey (2010). The View From Nowhen: The Mctaggart-Dummett Argument for the Unreality of Time. Philosophia 38 (2):297-312.
Daniel Morgan (2009). Can You Think My 'I'-Thoughts? Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):68-85.
Imogen Dickie & Gurpreet Rattan (2010). Sense, Communication, and Rational Engagement. Dialectica 64 (2):131-151.
Similar books and articles
Lynsey Wolter (2009). Demonstratives in Philosophy and Linguistics. Philosophy Compass 4 (3):451-468.
David Braun (1996). Demonstratives and Their Linguistic Meanings. Noûs 30 (2):145-173.
Jeffrey C. King (2008). Complex Demonstratives as Quantifiers: Objections and Replies. Philosophical Studies 141 (2):209 - 242.
Mark Textor (2007). Frege's Theory of Hybrid Proper Names Developed and Defended. Mind 116 (464):947-982.
Edward Harcourt (1999). Frege on 'I', 'Now', 'Today' and Some Other Linguistic Devices. Synthese 121 (3):329 - 356.
Ben Caplan (2002). Quotation and Demonstration. Philosophical Studies 111 (1):69-80.
Ernest Lepore & Kirk Ludwig (2000). The Semantics and Pragmatics of Complex Demonstratives. Mind 109 (434):199-240.
Kirk Ludwig (2000). The Semantics and Pragmatics of Complex Demonstratives. Mind 109 (434):199 - 240.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads109 ( #9,755 of 1,102,697 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #24,541 of 1,102,697 )
How can I increase my downloads?