Do demonstratives have senses?

Philosophers' Imprint 2 (2):1-33 (2002)
Frege held that referring expressions in general, and demonstratives and indexicals in particular, contribute more than just their reference to what is expressed by utterances of sentences containing them. Heck first attempts to get clear about what the essence of the Fregean view is, arguing that it rests upon a certain conception of linguistic communication that is ultimately indefensible. On the other hand, however, he argues that understanding a demonstrative (or indexical) utterance requires one to think of the object denoted in an appropriate way. This fact makes it difficult to reconcile the view that referring expressions are "directly referential" with any view that seeks (as Grice's does) to ground meaning in facts about communication.
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Matthias Haase (2014). Am I You? Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):358-371.
Jane Heal (2014). Second Person Thought. Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):317-331.

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