Is Compositionality a Trivial Principle?

Frontiers of Philosophy in China 8 (1):140-55 (2013)
Primarily a response to Paul Horwich's "Composition of Meanings", the paper attempts to refute his claim that compositionality—roughly, the idea that the meaning of a sentence is determined by the meanings of its parts and how they are there combined—imposes no substantial constraints on semantic theory or on our conception of the meanings of words or sentences. Show Abstract
Keywords Compositionality
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