Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):82–87 (2002)
|Abstract||In his 'Meaning and Truth-Conditions', Gary Kemp offers a reconstruction of Frege's infamous 'regress argument' which purports to rely only upon the premises that the meaning of a sentence is its truth-condition and that each sentence expresses a unique proposition. If cogent, the argument would show that only someone who accepts a form of semantic holism can use the notion of truth to explain that of meaning. I respond that Kemp relies heavily upon what he himself styles 'a literal, rather wooden' understanding of truth-conditions. I explore alternatives, and say a few words about how Frege's regress argument might best be understood|
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