David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 142 (3):317--352 (2005)
Hartry Field has suggested that we should adopt at least a methodological deflationism: [W]e should assume full-fledged deflationism as a working hypothesis. That way, if full-fledged deflationism should turn out to be inadequate, we will at least have a clearer sense than we now have of just where it is that inflationist assumptions ... are needed. I argue here that we do not need to be methodological deflationists. More pre-cisely, I argue that we have no need for a disquotational truth-predicate; that the word true, in ordinary language, is not a disquotational truth-predicate; and that it is not at all clear that it is even possible to introduce a disquotational truth-predicate into ordinary language. If so, then we have no clear sense how it is even possible to be a methodological deflationist. My goal here is not to convince a committed deflationist to abandon his or her position. My goal, rather, is to argue, contrary to what many seem to think, that reflection on the apparently trivial character of T-sentences should not incline us to deflationism.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Metaphysics Philosophy of Language|
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References found in this work BETA
Michael A. E. Dummett (1991). The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. Harvard University Press.
Paul Horwich (2005). Truth. In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), Erkenntnis. Oxford University Press 261-272.
Paul Horwich (1998). Meaning. Oxford University Press.
Hartry Field (2001). Truth and the Absence of Fact. Oxford University Press.
Scott Soames (1999). Understanding Truth. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Douglas Patterson (2009). Inconsistency Theories of Semantic Paradox. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):387 - 422.
Elia Zardini (2015). The Opacity of Truth. Topoi 34 (1):37-54.
Richard Heck (2012). A Liar Paradox. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):36-40.
Carlo Nicolai (2015). Deflationary Truth and the Ontology of Expressions. Synthese 192 (12):4031-4055.
Richard Heck (2012). More on 'A Liar Paradox'. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):270-280.
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