Truth in Frege

In M. Glanzberg (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Truth. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
Abstract
A general survey of Frege's views on truth, the paper explores the problems in response to which Frege's distinctive view that sentences refer to truth-values develops. It also discusses his view that truth-values are objects and the so-called regress argument for the indefinability of truth. Finally, we consider, very briefly, the question whether Frege was a deflationist.
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