That There Might Be Vague Objects (So Far as Concerns Logic)

The Monist 81 (1):277-99 (1998)
Abstract
Gareth Evans has argued that the existence of vague objects is logically precluded: The assumption that it is indeterminate whether some object a is identical to some object b leads to contradiction. I argue in reply that, although this is true—I thus defend Evans's argument, as he presents it—the existence of vague objects is not thereby precluded. An 'Indefinitist' need only hold that it is not logically required that every identity statement must have a determinate truth-value, not that some such statements might actually fail to have a determinate truth-value. That makes Indefinitism a cousin of mathematical Intuitionism.
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Citations of this work BETA
Richard Heck (2012). More on 'A Liar Paradox'. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):270-280.
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