Options and the subjective ought

Philosophical Studies 158 (2):343-360 (2012)
Options and the subjective ought Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-18 DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9880-0 Authors Brian Hedden, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116
Keywords Action theory  Rationality  Options  Ought  Bayesianism
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9880-0
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.

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Citations of this work BETA
Derek Baker (2015). Deliberators Must Be Imperfect. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3).
Brian Hedden (2015). Options and Diachronic Tragedy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):423-451.

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