Foundationalism and epistemic rationality

Philosophical Studies 42 (2):179 - 188 (1982)
Some foundationalists have argued that epistemic warrant may be in some measure determined by features of a doxastic agent's circumstances that are not necessarily accessible to the agent. 'externalist' views of this sort have been attacked recently by laurence bonjour on the grounds that they are at odds with the ordinary notion of "epistemic rationality". I suggest that this need not be so and argue that bonjour fails to provide convincing reasons for the rejection of externalist forms of foundationalism
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DOI 10.1007/BF00374032
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References found in this work BETA
Fred Dretske (1969). Seeing And Knowing. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
Laurence BonJour (1978). Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation? American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1):1-14.
William P. Alston (1976). Two Types of Foundationalism. Journal of Philosophy 73 (7):165-185.
William P. Alston (1980). Level-Confusions in Epistemology. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):135-150.

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