David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 42 (2):179 - 188 (1982)
Some foundationalists have argued that epistemic warrant may be in some measure determined by features of a doxastic agent's circumstances that are not necessarily accessible to the agent. 'externalist' views of this sort have been attacked recently by laurence bonjour on the grounds that they are at odds with the ordinary notion of "epistemic rationality". I suggest that this need not be so and argue that bonjour fails to provide convincing reasons for the rejection of externalist forms of foundationalism
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References found in this work BETA
Fred Dretske (1969). Seeing And Knowing. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
William P. Alston (1985). Concepts of Epistemic Justification. The Monist 68 (1):57-89.
Laurence BonJour (1978). Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation? American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1):1-14.
William P. Alston (1980). Level-Confusions in Epistemology. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):135-150.
William P. Alston (1976). Two Types of Foundationalism. Journal of Philosophy 73 (7):165-185.
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