Properties of the diversity effect in category-based inductive reasoning
Thinking and Reasoning 17 (2):156 - 181 (2011)
| Abstract | Four experiments investigated how people judge the plausibility of category-based arguments, focusing on the diversity effect, in which arguments with diverse premise categories are considered particularly strong. In Experiment 1 we show that priming people as to the nature of the blank property determines whether sensitivity to diversity is observed. In Experiment 2 we find that people's hypotheses about the nature of the blank property predict judgements of argument strength. In Experiment 3 we examine the effect of our priming methodology on people's tendency to bring knowledge about causality or similarity to bear when evaluating arguments, and in Experiment 4 we show that whether people's hypotheses about the nature of the blank property were causal predicted ratings of argument strength. Together these results suggest that diversity effects occur because diverse premises lead people to bring general features of the premise categories to mind. Although our findings are broadly consistent with Bayesian and Relevance-based approaches to category-based inductive reasoning, neither approach captures all of our findings | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,653 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesEvan Heit & Caren M. Rotello (2012). The Pervasive Effects of Argument Length on Inductive Reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning 18 (3):244 - 277.
Barbara A. Spellman (1999). Hypothesis Testing: Strategy Selection for Generalising Versus Limiting Hypotheses. Thinking and Reasoning 5 (1):67 – 92.
Gedeon Deák, Hong Li, Yiyuan Li, Bihua Cao & Fuhong Li (2011). The Law of Large Numbers in Children's Diversity-Based Reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning 15 (4):388-404.
Charles W. Kalish & Christopher A. Lawson (2007). Negative Evidence and Inductive Generalisation. Thinking and Reasoning 13 (4):394 – 425.
Clare R. Walsh & Ruth M. J. Byrne (2007). How People Think “If Only …” About Reasons for Actions. Thinking and Reasoning 13 (4):461 – 483.
Aidan Feeney, Jonathan Evans & Simon Venn (2008). Rarity, Pseudodiagnosticity and Bayesian Reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning 14 (3):209 – 230.
Simon Venn, Jonathan Evans & Aidan Feeney (2008). Rarity, Pseudodiagnosticity and Bayesian Reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning 14 (3):209-230.
Rosemary J. Stevenson & David E. Over (2001). Reasoning From Uncertain Premises: Effects of Expertise and Conversational Context. Thinking and Reasoning 7 (4):367 – 390.
Victoria F. Shaw (1996). The Cognitive Processes in Informal Reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning 2 (1):51 – 80.
Sylvia Hurtado, Matthew J. Mayhew & Mark E. Engberg (2012). Diversity Courses and Students' Moral Reasoning: A Model of Predispositions and Change. Journal of Moral Education 41 (2):201-224.
York Hagmayer, Björn Meder, Momme von Sydow & Michael R. Waldmann (2011). Category Transfer in Sequential Causal Learning: The Unbroken Mechanism Hypothesis. Cognitive Science 35 (5):842-873.
Gregory L. Murphy, Stephanie Y. Chen & Brian H. Ross (2012). Reasoning with Uncertain Categories. Thinking and Reasoning 18 (1):81 - 117.
Marjorie Rhodes & Daniel Brickman (2010). The Role of Within-Category Variability in Category-Based Induction: A Developmental Study. Cognitive Science 34 (8):1561-1573.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2011-05-05Total downloads8 ( #122,951 of 548,984 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,327 of 548,984 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
