Rationality and psychological explanation

Inquiry 28 (1-4):359 – 371 (1985)
Abstract
Certain philosophical arguments apparently show that the having of beliefs is tied conceptually to rationality. Such a view, however, seems at odds both with the possibility of irrational belief and with recent empirical discoveries in the psychology of reasoning. The aim of this paper is to move toward a reconciliation of these apparently conflicting perspectives by distinguishing between internalist and externalist conceptions of rationality. It is argued that elements of each are required for a satisfactory theory, one that allows for the possibility of irrationality and makes sense of empirical findings without violating conditions on belief ascription. Normative theories, on this view, constrain the latter while remaining silent on the character of actual psychological mechanisms
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,357
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA
    Christopher Cherniak (1981). Feasible Inferences. Philosophy of Science 48 (2):248-268.
    John Heil (1983). Perception and Cognition. University of California Press.

    View all 8 references

    Citations of this work BETA
    Newton C. A. da Costa & Steven French (1993). A Model Theoretic Approach to 'Natural' Reasoning. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (2):177-190.
    Similar books and articles
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2009-03-05

    Total downloads

    8 ( #138,555 of 1,088,426 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #69,601 of 1,088,426 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.