David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Cambridge University Press (1992)
This book aims at reconciling the emerging conceptions of mind and their contents that have, in recent years, come to seem irreconcilable. Post-Cartesian philosophers face the challenge of comprehending minds as natural objects possessing apparently non-natural powers of thought. The difficulty is to understand how our mental capacities, no less than our biological or chemical characteristics, might ultimately be products of our fundamental physical constituents, and to do so in a way that preserves the phenomena. Externalists argue that the significance of thought turns on the circumstances of thinkers; reductionists hold that mental characteristics are physical; eliminationists contend that the concept of thought belongs to an outmoded folk theory of behavior. John Heil explores these topics and points the way to a naturalistic synthesis, one that accords the mental a place in the physical world alongside the non-mental.
|Keywords||Behavior Cartesianism Causation Cognition Dualism Metaphysics Mind Nature Reductionism Supervenience|
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|Buy the book||$6.76 used (89% off) $20.00 new (67% off) $48.20 direct from Amazon (20% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||BD418.3.H45 1992|
|ISBN(s)||9780521413374 0521424003 0521413370|
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Citations of this work BETA
Alison Gopnik (1993). How We Know Our Minds: The Illusion of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):1.
A. Goldman (1993). The Psychology of Folk Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.
Jessica M. Wilson (2005). Supervenience-Based Formulations of Physicalism. Noûs 39 (3):426-459.
Chris Moore & John Barresi (1993). Knowledge of the Psychological States of Self and Others is Not Only Theory-Laden but Also Data-Driven. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):61.
Michelle Montague (2007). Against Propositionalism. Noûs 41 (3):503–518.
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