David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophers' Imprint 6 (2):1-24 (2006)
The naive realist takes a veridical visual experience to be an immediate relation to external entities. Is this how such an experience is phenomenally, by its phenomenal character? Only if there can be phenomenal error, since a hallucinatory experience phenomenally matching such a veridical experience would then be phenomenally but not in fact such a relation. Fortunately, such phenomenal error can be avoided: the phenomenal character of a visual experience involves immediate awareness of a sort of picture of external entities, as on a representative theory of perception. The attraction of naive realism results from an erroneous projection of the immediacy of the subject's awareness of this picture onto the external entities pictured.
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Boyd Millar (2014). The Phenomenological Directness of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Studies 170 (2):235-253.
Casey O'Callaghan (2011). Lessons From Beyond Vision (Sounds and Audition). Philosophical Studies 153 (1):143-160.
Jonathan Cohen (2010). Perception and Computation. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):96-124.
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