David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Society 1 (2):107-125 (2000)
The paper offers a critical examination of Jennifer Hornsby's view that actions are internal to the body. It focuses on three of Hornsby's central claims: (P) many actions are bodily movements (in a special sense of the word “movement”) (Q) all actions are tryings; and (R) all actions occur inside the body. It is argued, contra Hornsby, that we may accept (P) and (Q) without accepting also the implausible (R). Two arguments are first offered in favour of the thesis (Contrary-R): that no actions occur inside the body. Three of Hornsby's arguments in favour of R are then examined. It is argued that we need to make a distinction between the causes and the causings of bodily movements (in the ordinary sense of the word “movement”) and that actions ought to be identified with the latter rather than the former. This distinction is then used to show how Hornsby's arguments for (R) may be resisted
|Keywords||action bodily movement causation Hornsby mental events trying|
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Citations of this work BETA
Jennifer Hornsby (2012). Actions and Activity. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):233-245.
Helen Steward (2009). The Truth in Compatibilism and the Truth of Libertarianism. Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):167 – 179.
Alec Hinshelwood (2013). The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Settling: Some Anscombean Reservations. Inquiry 56 (6):625-638.
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