Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value

Cambridge University Press (2001)
Abstract
How can we motivate ourselves to do what we think we ought? How can we deliberate about personal values and priorities? Bennett Helm argues that standard philosophical answers to these questions presuppose a sharp distinction between cognition and conation that undermines an adequate understanding of values and their connection to motivation and deliberation. Rejecting this distinction, Helm argues that emotions are fundamental to any account of value and motivation, and he develops a detailed alternative theory both of emotions, desires, and evaluative judgments and of their rational interconnections. The result is an innovative theory of practical rationality and of how we can control not only what we do but also what we value and who we are as persons.
Keywords Emotions (Philosophy  Reasoning  Free will and determinism  Ethics
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Call number B105.E46.H45 2001
ISBN(s) 0521801109   0521039118   9780521801102   9780521039116
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