David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Cambridge University Press (2001)
How can we motivate ourselves to do what we think we ought? How can we deliberate about personal values and priorities? Bennett Helm argues that standard philosophical answers to these questions presuppose a sharp distinction between cognition and conation that undermines an adequate understanding of values and their connection to motivation and deliberation. Rejecting this distinction, Helm argues that emotions are fundamental to any account of value and motivation, and he develops a detailed alternative theory both of emotions, desires, and evaluative judgments and of their rational interconnections. The result is an innovative theory of practical rationality and of how we can control not only what we do but also what we value and who we are as persons.
|Keywords||Emotions (Philosophy Reasoning Free will and determinism Ethics|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$41.99 used (36% off) $47.04 new (28% off) $64.99 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||B105.E46.H45 2001|
|ISBN(s)||0521801109 0521039118 9780521801102 9780521039116|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Sabine A. Döring (2007). Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rational Motivation. Dialectica 61 (3):363-394.
Simon D. Feldman & Allan Hazlett (2013). Authenticity and Self‐Knowledge. Dialectica 67 (2):157-181.
Jona Vance (2014). Emotion and the New Epistemic Challenge From Cognitive Penetrability. Philosophical Studies 169 (2):257-283.
Bennett W. Helm (2015). Emotions and Recalcitrance: Reevaluating the Perceptual Model. Dialectica 69 (3):417-433.
Hanno Sauer (2012). Psychopaths and Filthy Desks: Are Emotions Necessary and Sufficient for Moral Judgment? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):95-115.
Similar books and articles
Patricia S. Greenspan (2004). Emotions, Rationality, and Mind-Body. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press 113-125.
Rosalind Hursthouse (2002). Review: Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation and the Nature of Value. [REVIEW] Mind 111 (442):418-422.
Patricia Greenspan (1988). Emotions and Reasons: An Inquiry Into Emotional Justification. Routledge, Chapman and Hall.
Bennett W. Helm (2009). Emotions as Evaluative Feelings. Emotion Review 1 (3):248--55.
Bert Molewijk, Dick Kleinlugtenbelt & Guy Widdershoven (2011). The Role of Emotions in Moral Case Deliberation: Theory, Practice, and Methodology. Bioethics 25 (7):383-393.
Michael Lacewing (2005). Emotional Self-Awareness and Ethical Deliberation. Ratio 18 (1):65-81.
Justin D'arms (2004). Bennett Helm, Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), Pp. X + 261. Utilitas 16 (3):343-345.
Bennett W. Helm (2001). Emotions and Practical Reason: Rethinking Evaluation and Motivation. Noûs 35 (2):190–213.
Karen Jones (2003). Bennett Helm, Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation and the Nature of Value:Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation and the Nature of Value. Ethics 114 (1):179-182.
Bennett W. Helm (2000). Emotional Reason How to Deliberate About Value. American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (1):1-22.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads68 ( #62,186 of 1,902,195 )
Recent downloads (6 months)12 ( #59,797 of 1,902,195 )
How can I increase my downloads?