David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306 (2007)
This paper expands on the discussion in the first section of 'Beyond phenomenal naivete'. Let Phenomenal Naivete be understood as the doctrine that some phenomenal characters of veridical experiences are factive properties concerning the external world. Here I present in detail a phenomenological case for Phenomenal Naivete and an argument from hallucination against it. I believe that these arguments show the concept of phenomenal character to be defective, overdetermined by its metaphysical and epistemological commitments together with the world. This does not establish a gappish eliminativism, but a gluttish pluralism, on which there are many imperfect deservers of the name 'phenomenal character'. Different projects in the philosophy of mind -- phenomenology, philosophy of conscious, metaphysics and epistemology of perception -- are concerned with different deservers of the name.
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References found in this work BETA
J. L. Austin (1962). Sense and Sensibilia. Oxford University Press.
C. D. Broad (1958). Philosophy (I). Inquiry 1 (1-4):99 – 129.
C. D. Broad (1923). Scientific Thought. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Alex Byrne (2001). Intentionalism Defended. Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
Citations of this work BETA
Ned Block (2010). Attention and Mental Paint1. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):23-63.
Adam Pautz (2013). Do the Benefits of Naïve Realism Outweigh the Costs? Comments on Fish, Perception, Hallucination and Illusion. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):25-36.
Greg Janzen (2011). In Defense of the What-It-is-Likeness of Experience. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):271-293.
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Katalin Balog (2008). Review of Torin Alter, Sven Walter (Eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (5).
Benj Hellie (2006). Beyond Phenomenal Naivete. Philosophers' Imprint 6 (2):1-24.
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