Higher-order intentionalism and higher-order acquaintance

Philosophical Studies 134 (3):289--324 (2007)
I argue against such "Relation Intentionalist" theories of consciousness as the higher-order thought and inner sense views on the grounds that they understand a subject's awareness of his or her phenomenal characters to be intentional, like seeming-seeing, rather than "direct", like seeing. The trouble with such views is that they reverse the order of explanation between phenomenal character and intentional awareness. A superior theory of consciousness, based on views expressed by Russell and Price, takes the relation of awareness to be a nonintentional "acquaintance"
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy of Religion   Philosophy of Mind   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy
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References found in this work BETA
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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Benj Hellie (2007). Factive Phenomenal Characters. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.

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