Higher-order intentionalism and higher-order acquaintance

Philosophical Studies 134 (3):289--324 (2007)
Abstract
I argue against such "Relation Intentionalist" theories of consciousness as the higher-order thought and inner sense views on the grounds that they understand a subject's awareness of his or her phenomenal characters to be intentional, like seeming-seeing, rather than "direct", like seeing. The trouble with such views is that they reverse the order of explanation between phenomenal character and intentional awareness. A superior theory of consciousness, based on views expressed by Russell and Price, takes the relation of awareness to be a nonintentional "acquaintance".
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    References found in this work BETA
    Alex Byrne (2001). Intentionalism Defended. Philosophical Review 110 (2):199 - 240.
    Stewart Cohen (1984). Justification and Truth. Philosophical Studies 46 (3):279--95.

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