Induction [Book Review]

Review of Metaphysics 37 (2):416-417 (1983)
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Abstract

Following the works of Popper, people usually do not believe that induction is a method of science: inductive reasoning has been effectively replaced by different versions of falsificationism. Rescher argues that falsificationism cannot be considered as a "genuine alternative" to inductivism, because the object of inquiry is to find out the truth, and falsification of a hypothesis excludes only one possibility, but leaves all others open. "If we know that fingerprint is not X's, that still leaves Y, Z, and a great many others". The point is, however, that contemporary science, in fact, employs the method "of hypothesis and testing, of conjecture and refutations", and we should guess science's goals from actual scientific methods rather than conversely. Nonetheless, one should admit that certain elements of inductive reasoning are inherent in the scientific method and a sort of induction certainly plays an important role in everyday situations. This makes the problem of induction actual and Rescher's book is to be welcomed as giving a new insight into the question.

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