Inexpressible truths and the allure of the knowledge argument

In Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary. The MIT Press 333 (2004)
I argue on linguistic grounds that when Mary comes to know what it's like to see a red thing, she comes to know a certain inexpressible truth about the character of her own experience. This affords a "no concept" reply to the knowledge argument. The reason the Knowledge Argument has proven so intractable may be that we believe that an inexpressible concept and an expressible concept cannot have the same referent
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Benj Hellie (2007). Factive Phenomenal Characters. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.

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