David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Jenann’s central metaphysical thesis is that there is an objective conditional probability function PrG(A/B), the domain of which includes a great many, perhaps all, pairs of contingent propositions. This pair can be synchronic or diachronic: both can concern how things are at the same time, or not. Jenann’s central epistemological thesis is antiskepticism about PrG, in the following sense: prima facie, the subjective credence functions of epistemically reasonable agents converge on PrG: roughly, if you’ve done a lot of science, for all A, B, your C(A/B) is similar to PrG(A/B). (Compare antiskepticism about perceptual knowledge: prima facie, if circumstances are good and one’s visual experience represents that p, p.) These theses have two cool consequences: ﬁrst, the possibility of a novel approach to objective Bayesianism; second, a way of doing away with dynamical laws
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Haines Brown (2013). A Process Ontology. Axiomathes:1-22.
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